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Editorial
CHAOHUA WANG AND MINGWEI  SONG
The present special feature focuses on utopian/dystopian literature incontemporary China. Why publish a special feature on literary repre-sentations of the utopian/dystopian in China Perspectives, a journal
that focuses on Chinese political analysis? In the first place, utopia has al-
ways been a political issue, according to Fredric Jameson; (1) or as Douwe
Fokkema claims, “[u]topian fiction is arguably the most political of all liter-
ary genres and can be studied from a literary as well as a political point of
view.” (2) Utopia, named by Thomas More in the sixteenth century and re-
peatedly revived, reinvented, and reprogrammed by later reformers and rev-
olutionaries, projects an ideal vision of human society that contrasts with
the unsatisfying reality, and through literary imagination translates social
criticism into a political and/or technological blueprint for a better world.
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the popularisation of
utopian thinking in a European context particularly testified to the enthu-
siasm of Enlightenment thinkers, revolutionaries, and social reformers to-
ward engineering a perfect society according to scientific knowledge and
reason. In a twentieth century that saw the ruin of various utopian projects,
a sweeping disillusionment with utopian thinking gave rise to a dystopian
literature that has evolved into a distinct genre with its own classics and
conventions. Dystopia is generally considered the opposite of utopia. How-
ever, if the utopian vision of a good place and a perfect world as alternatives
to social reality can be viewed “as a privileged means to convey a potentially
subversive message,” (3) the same can be said about the dystopian vision
that should be, “in fact, a variant of the same social dreaming that gives
impetus to utopian literature.” (4) Both utopian and dystopian literatures are
characterised by engagement with social problems, and their difference
mainly lies in varying approaches to solutions: utopia presents a systematic
solution to all social, political, and cultural problems, while the dystopian
vision never fails to reveal the constraints imposed on humanity by any
available or imaginable political systems.
In China, it was Yan Fu 嚴復 who first coined the phrase “wutuobang” 烏
托邦 to translate the word Utopia, (5) and since the last decade of late Qing,
utopian thinking has shaped the thoughts of many generations of Chinese
reformers and revolutionaries. Political events in the late Qing might convey
a gloomy picture, from China’s defeat in the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War
to the failed Hundred-Day Reform of 1898; from the disastrous Boxer Re-
bellion to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, fought on Chinese territory
while the Qing court declared “neutrality.” Yet it was also a moment of be-
lated initiation into world affairs for many young literati activists, who were
utterly captivated by the seemingly infinite potential of the future. With
many varied strands, the contour of Chinese utopianism at the turn of the
twentieth century was decisively optimistic, in stark contrast to the dire
situation the country was in. Kang Youwei’s 康有為 Book of Great Unity (Da
tong shu 大同書, the composition date of which remained controversial)
presented the most systematic politico-philosophical discourse on a utopian
vision of the future China. Utopian novels, the very first of which was Liang
Qichao’s 梁啟超 Future of New China (Xin Zhongguo weilai ji 新中國未來
記, 1902), soon became an established genre. (6) Generally speaking, at the
risk of oversimplification, these novels tend to depict a future China that
retains a political Confucianism, whose ideal social order would have to be
bound to traditional agrarian society, but the authors seldom provide any
consideration of it. Sensually, they are completely urban and excitedly ex-
hibitionist in character, informed mostly by life in Shanghai and possibly
Hong Kong as well. Some of the more politically framed works were never
finished, including Liang’s Future of New China. It is as if the authors were
unable to reconcile the divide between the political and the sensual, while
the utopian construction is premised on both.
Within a decade, there were several dozen utopian fictional works pub-
lished. (7) Late Qing utopian literature served to instigate fascination with
the future rather than arousing indignation through social criticisms against
the present. The task of social critique was taken up by a parallel genre, ex-
posure literature, with greater output and huge popularity among urban
readers. The utopian genre lost its appeal after May Fourth literature estab-
lished realism as the main paradigm of modern Chinese literature. While
utopian literature ebbed, China was to enter the age of political utopia in
actual social practice in both the Nanjing years of the Republican period
(1928-1937) and in the People’s Republic under Mao Zedong (1949-1976).
Henry Y. H. Zhao comments on the phenomena, literary and political, that
“the utopian future no longer needed imagination to access it, as social re-
ality itself was pregnant with the future: the separation between the utopia
and the reality had to be scaled with power but not imagination.” (8)
For the better part of the twentieth century, China was embroiled in wars
and revolutions – civil wars and anti-imperialist wars; Republican Revolution
and Communist Revolution; the Cold War externally, and the turmoil of the
Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution internally. Most of the his-
torical dramas involved mass mobilisation with utopian visions, at least as-
piration to national liberation to make China strong and wealthy. This
historical condition, atypical for a Western country, was common to most
Third World nations. The experience, in addition to adapting to a dominant
view of history in linear and progressive terms, entailed a general disregard
for dystopian thinking, emerging strongly in the West in the first half of the
century. In the West, Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932) and George
Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-four (1949) represent the two major fronts of
dystopian critique against, respectively, capitalist reification of labouring
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citizens and Stalinist tyranny under Communist rule. They were not available
to readers inside the PRC, where Maoist utopianism did not decline until
the Reform Era. (9) This was after Mao’s death and the end of the Cultural
Revolution (1966-1976), when the ruling party announced that “class strug-
gle” would no longer be the focal task. The new imperative was economic
development aimed at raising living standards to “relatively well-off” 
(xiaokang 小康) by the end of the twentieth century. Intellectually, the Re-
form Era was advanced by a short-lived “thought liberation” campaign in
1978. In this period, political idealism combined with the pursuit of greater
freedom in literature and arts, and reflections on the historical experiences
of the PRC’s first 30 years enabled both hope for change and precaution
against radicalism. 
Literature flourished in the thaw. New topics, styles, or genres emerged
almost every year. But utopian/dystopian literature was very much absent
for almost the entire decade of the 1980s, China’s “New Era.” Accordingly,
our special feature on utopian/dystopian fiction falls within the time frame
of the late 1980s up to the present. In the past ten years or so, this period
has been referred to as the era of Chinese “post-socialism.” Our contributors
use this term in their papers as well. A brief survey of recent scholarship
shows that the label, though convenient, leads to varied interpretations. 
Since the end of the Cold War, scholarly reference to countries of the for-
mer East Bloc has generally used the term “post-communism,” accepted in
various academic disciplines. The label “post-socialism” thus stands for China
alone, tailor-made for the contemporary period since the 1990s. In this way,
it is ten years shorter than the denominator of the “Reform Era.” Two books
that came out in 2008 bear the term in their titles, with different theoretical
references. They are Xudong Zhang’s Postsocialism and Cultural Politics and
Jason McGrath’s Postsocialist Modernity. (10) Zhang’s book is partly based
on his collaboration with Arif Dirlik on postmodernism in China for a special
issue of boundary 2 in 1997. In turn, Dirlik had critiqued the phrase “Asia-
Pacific” and has looked for postmodern alternative spaces in that region
since the early 1990s. (11) For Zhang, postmodernity was the key word that
led to introducing “postsocialism” into his discussion. McGrath, on the other
hand, makes postsocialist modernity a central thesis of his book and does
not trust a postmodern perspective for the 1990s. Their differences notwith-
standing, the two authors share some basic views on what is “post” and
what is “socialism” in the term when they apply it to China’s reality. For
them, the “post” in this case indicates the pervasive presence of global cap-
italism in China, or China’s integration into the global order, which was not
there in the Mao years or the post-Mao 1980s. Meanwhile, “socialism” for
the two authors is represented primarily by a Communist Party staying in
power, overseeing a spectacular economic growth propelling China into a
new superpower. 
Taking different approaches to the question, Robin Visser and Shu-mei
Shih stretch the postsocialist period to the beginning of the Reform Era.
Similar to Zhang and McGrath, they recognise the relative autonomy cul-
tural production gained in those years. But Visser and Shih do not provide
theoretical elaboration on the label (or lay claims over certain values by
appropriating it). Instead, they focus more on the formation of individual
subjectivity in the more than three decades of drastic social change. (12) Shih
argues that the most valuable contribution of the Chinese postsocialist ex-
perience is the intellectual turn in the initial years of the Reform Era toward
Marxist humanism, which echoed similar turns among international Marx-
ists in the 1960s, such as the Senegalese leader Léopold Sédar Senghor’s
essay entitled “Socialism Is a Humanism.” Shih imagines that Marxist hu-
manism should provide much needed stimulus to our contemporary dis-
cussions on “post-humanism” and other issues. 
In this special issue, our contributors apply the term “postsocialism” in a
spirit closer to Visser and Shih. We do not imply fixed value judgment on
qualities of Chinese socialist modernity or postmodernity. For us, the term
itself is conveniently useful to convey the recognition that, from the 1980s
to the 1990s, China crossed a decisive turning point. We acknowledge the
historical complexity of that moment. From our point of view, we would
like to emphasise the importance of utopian thinking in socialist and com-
munist movements. There is no question that it weighed heavily in the Chi-
nese socialist experiment, as it did in Chinese people’s lives for several
generations. Against this backdrop, when utopian/dystopian literature reap-
peared – with great energy and vitality, after half a century of near silence
– by the end of the 1980s, the fact itself is far richer in meaning than the
plots of the specific literary texts themselves. Utopia has always been a po-
litical issue, and contemporary Chinese utopian/dystopian fiction speaks
directly to the political nature of the country’s public life. 
Before sketching out a chronological chart of the fictional works discussed
in our papers, it is important to remember that utopian/dystopian fiction
has not been the only form within which related issues have drawn public
attention, especially intellectual attention, in contemporary China. As Shu-
mei Shih tells us, in the “thought liberation” movement of 1978-1983,
Marxist humanism was a prominent strand, explored purposefully in search
of a sound moral premise for China’s socialist project in reflecting on the
Cultural Revolution. (13) The debate was abruptly stopped by the Party’s func-
tionary ideologues, but intellectuals continued their effort. Serious exami-
nation of the dark side of the Party’s utopian myth, such as Su Xiaokang’s
reportage Memorial to Utopia (1988), on the Party’s internal struggle in
1959 over the Great Leap Forward, presented challenging views with respect
to idealistic spirit. (14) As late as the late 1990s, well after the end of the Cold
War, thoughtful intellectuals were defending utopian thinking. For example,
Qin Hui argued in 1998 that in the wave of former communist countries
rushing to embrace capitalism, be it democratic or authoritarian, it is nec-
essary to retain utopian values for the sake of a social consensus on justice.
Even followers of the liberal economic thinker Hayek, when reflecting on
the wrongs of the socialist experiment, should repudiate conceit but not
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faith in knowledge and reason. Similarly, Xiao Xuehui urged policy makers
to rethink the education privatisation measures of 1997, citing Thomas
More’s Utopia and Tommaso Campanella’s The City of the Sun (1602) to
argue for the necessity of utopian guidance in educational planning. (15)
Unfortunately, these were lone voices in a sea of dismissive commentaries.
As Jameson laments, utopia became a synonym for Stalinism in the West dur-
ing the Cold War and in Eastern European countries immediately after its
end; (16) the same can be said of contemporary China, where the utopian nowa-
days indicates for many intellectuals the “mere ‘impracticality’ of Maoism.” (17)
What has conditioned the decline of utopianism in China over the past 25
years is not only the end of the Cold War, shifts in international politics, and
the inward march of global capitalism, but also the collapse of political idealism
after the brutal crackdown of the 1989 student movement. But what comes
after utopia is not necessarily dystopia; it can be instead a pervasive cynicism
and political apathy, as happened in China’s post-1989 years, an era marked
by rapid economic development, high-level marketisation in all social domains,
and devaluation of intellectual interventions in social reality.
Strikingly, and perhaps not entirely unlike the late Qing period,
utopian/dystopian fiction writing of this period did not lock steps with ei-
ther immediate socio-political events or mainstream opinions. The au-
tonomous space in cultural production gained from loosened political
control, the weak interest in imaginative vision among intellectuals, and the
lack of substance in official propaganda, have all contributed to the fact
that, even if their work might be banned at one time or another, writers
could have considerable freedom to confront the immensely uncertain fu-
ture, brutally torn wide open by a society almost constantly transformed
and/or reconfigured. Being conditioned in this way, fictional imaginary in
the works considered by our papers shares certain inclinations. They tend
to be socially bleak, politically ambiguous, and culturally wanting while
technologically fascinating. In short, dystopian leaning commands the upper
hand. What counts for potent utopian imagination, as Adrian Thieret ex-
plains in his paper, may come in a postmodern fragmented fashion. The late
Qing style of confidently announcing a bright future arriving from temporal
distance has completely vanished. 
Readers will notice that this special issue is not an exhaustive examination
of the subject. Still, in a limited space we have tried to cover some major
works in the field. The earliest one, China 2185, discussed in Mingwei Song’s
paper, was written in February 1989 by China’s leading SF writer of today,
Liu Cixin. The timing is important. People often forget the restless sensation
of the social atmosphere in the year leading up to the Tiananmen protests.
After ten years of “reform and opening,” spreading corruption was damaging
the general confidence of society. To people’s questioning, the government
excused itself by claiming that it could not offer a plan in advance but was
“feeling the stones to cross the river” (mozhe shitou guohe 摸著石頭過河).
At the time that Liu Cixin created his first scientific fantasy, other artists
gave similarly perceptive performances as well. One day before the Chinese
New Year in 1989, a woman artist, unexpectedly to the viewing public,
opened fire with a pistol on her installation art work at the Exhibition of
China’s Modern Arts in the National Gallery, causing an instant shut-down.
That evening, at the Chinese New Year gala, an annual event televised na-
tionwide by the central television station (CCTV), a famous crosstalk actor
made a joke about the marketisation of social life, alleging that Tiananmen
Square had been turned into a gigantic farmer’s market. The gasping aston-
ishment at early marketisation, ordered and pushed bureaucratically, was
best conveyed in Wang Shuo’s 王朔 novel of absurdity, Please Don’t Call Me
Human (Qianwan bie ba wo dang ren 千萬別把我當人), serialised in a lit-
erary magazine beginning in summer 1989. At the beginning of that year,
student activists were already counting the anniversary dates to organise
public rallies: the 70-year anniversary of the May Fourth Movement, the
200-year anniversary of the French Revolution in July, and the 40-year an-
niversary of the PRC in October. It was also ahead of the student protests
when Wu Wenguang, a leading independent documentary maker, started
shooting his signature work, Bumming in Beijing, in 1988. To Wu and his
artist friends, these were the last days of their youthful idealism. Yet, the
style of their spirit, voluntary marginalisation and conscious resistance
against establishment, was already distinctively different from the mid-80s,
when “cultural fever” was running high and Zhang Yimou made his flam-
boyantly colourful entry into filmmaking. Wu’s style was to be typical of
the independent cinema of the 1990s.
Two novels covered by our papers are products of the early 1990s, in the
immediate aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown. Wang Lixiong’s Yellow
Peril (1991), examined in Chaohua Wang’s paper, remains an outstanding
political fantasy of his generation. Though it may not result from authorial
intention, his work demonstrates most clearly how the ruling power in China
might have been run without any visible constraints from socialist ideology.
Jia Pingwa’s The Decadent Capital (1993), on the other hand, goes along
the same direction as Wang Shuo’s novel mentioned above. In fact, there
was a wave of similarly-themed novels in those years. A better known ex-
ample would be Mo Yan’s 莫言 Republic of Wine (Jiu guo 酒國 1992), which
carries some direct references to Wang Shuo’s work. Each of these novels
plays on the decadent absurdity of the commercialisation of social life, with
the implied absence of popular political intervention. They may not be
utopian/dystopian fiction in a strict sense, but their bleak depiction presents
a dystopian-style rejection of the perceived new order of the post-Tianan-
men years. They best support our assumption that a better approach to
postsocialist China is to temporarily suspend our fixation on the Party and
the state. In his paper on Jia’s novel, Thomas Chen chooses to focus on one
of the key literary devices Jia deploys in The Decadent Capital in great quan-
tity – the little blank squares presumably representing words removed by
censorship. With careful textual analysis, Chen teases out the hidden sig-
nificance of the “publicness” in collective life, which was aggressively sup-
pressed from public consciousness. 
It was not our initial design, but by coincidence, the three papers by Ming-
wei Song, Chaohua Wang, and Thomas Chen each cover two major periods
in Chinese utopian/dystopian fiction writing: 1989-1993 and 2007-2010.
Indeed, there was a detectable decade-long gap in the genre’s publication
record from the mid 1990s onwards, although science fiction was still being
published during that time. Liu Cixin, author of China 2185, started regular
production in 1999. Mingwei Song’s discussion includes a short story Liu
wrote in 1999. Still, the gap requires attention. For one thing, intellectual
defence of utopian ideas, mentioned above, occurred when fictional utopia
was weak. A possible explanation could be this. Sarcastically expressed in-
dignation towards rampant commercialisation in the early 1990s could only
watch from the sidelines as waves of marketisation swept away guaranteed
N o . 2 0 1 5 / 1  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 5
15. Qin Hui, “Wutuobang yu qiangzhi” (Utopia and coercion), Twenty-first Century (Hong Kong), Oc-
tober 1998. Xiao Xuehui, Jiaoyu biyao de wutuobang (Education: A necessary Utopia), Fujian jiaoyu
chubanshe, 2001. 
16. Fredric Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future, London, Verso, 2007, p. xi.
17. Jeffrey Kinkley, Visions of Dystopia in China’s New Historical Novels, New York, Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 2014, p. 5.
public services, the legacy of China’s socialist past: education, healthcare,
housing, and government-sponsored land sales were all targeted for mar-
ketisation in 1997-98. The utopian impulse needs space to breath, and it
needs stimuli as well. These came in the first years of the twenty-first cen-
tury primarily from the pervasive impact of capitalist globalisation, following
China’s WTO membership at the end of 2001. 
For this recent period, Mingwei Song introduces Liu Cixin’s “Three Body”
trilogy, Chaohua Wang considers Chan Koonchung’s political dystopia, The
Fat Years, and Thomas Chen compares the reissue of Jia Pingwa’s The
Decadent Capital in 2009, after a 14-year ban by the authorities, to its
original edition. It is in this period that our fourth contributor, Adrian
Thieret, focuses his attention on utopian impulse, not dystopian presen-
tations, in Liu Cixin’s science fiction short stories. The theoretical impli-
cation of Thieret’s reading in terms of utopian impulse as an agency of
social reform brings our special issue into direct dialogue with contem-
porary critique of capitalist globalisation. The field we are engaging in with
this special issue is extremely rich. Our work presented here is but a small
effort to understand, by way of reading utopian/dystopian fiction, the pro-
found changes China has been wading through, in connection with their
worldwide implications.
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